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Deployment of IPD laboratory in Guinea
The unit of Arbovirus and Haemorrhagic Fever Viruses at the 
Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), a WHO-approved collaborating 
Centre was the first laboratory deployed to Conakry in the Ebola virus 
disease (EVD) outbreak in West-Africa. On 20 March 2014, the IPD 
laboratory received a letter from the WHO and the Guinean Ministry 
of Health, informing about a suspected haemorrhagic fever outbreak 
and difficulties to send collected samples to the IPD. They therefore 
requested the deployment of experts to Guinea for technical support 
in order to diagnose the haemorrhagic fever of unknown origin. The 
outbreak was identified by the Institut Pasteur (France) on 21 March 
2014 [1,2] in samples shipped to France by a Médecins sans Frontières 
investigation team.
On 23 March 2014, an IPD team was deployed in Conakry, at Donka 
Hospital, and was the first laboratory arriving in Guinea. The same day, 
they analysed samples from Macenta, Guéckédou, Kissidougou and 
confirmed EBOV as responsible for the outbreak. The IPD laboratory 
detected the first EVD cases in Conakry on 26 March and in Liberia on 
29 March 2014. 
Laboratory structure and procedures
The Institut Pasteur de Dakar mobile laboratory (IPD-ML) was set 
up in Donka hospital in the Infectious Disease Department. The IPD 
ML operated daily 14 hours from 7.00 to 21.00 and sometimes until 
late at night. It was organized in pre-analytical, analytical and post-
analytical areas. 
For the pre-analytical step, a reception area for samples collected 
at Ebola Treatment Centers (ETC) and from community deaths was 
established at the entrance of the IPD-ML. On sample receipt an IPD 
sample request form adapted for EVD suspect cases, containing date 
of collection, origin, type of samples (serum whole blood, swabs...) was 
recorded in a register. 
Samples processing was subdivided into 3 rooms: (i) room 
for  samples inactivation containing a PSM III glove box (BDK 
Luft, Genkingen, Germany) or a mobile glove box (Könnecke 
Präzisionsmechanik, Germany) connected to room (ii) used for viral 
RNA extraction containing a PSM II (Nuaire, Minnesota, USA) (Figure 1).
Daily first activities included preparation of decontamination solutions 
(1% Incidin, Ecolab, Germany) and receiving a delivery of diesel fuel for 
the generators which were absoulutely necessary due to the instability of 
the power supply by the national company, Electricité De Guinée (EDG). 
Laboratory staff wore personal protective equipment (PPE), 
consisting of a protective suit (Tyvek Dupont), a mask, goggles, two 
pairs of latex gloves with the inner pair taped to the protective suit and 
a pair shoes and waterproof shoe covers.
On arrival the packaging of samples was disinfected externally by 
spraying with 1 % incidine and the inner second package transferred 
into a biosafety cabinet class III (glove box) where specimen were 
unpacked. 
Inactivation of samples was performed inside the glovebox 
by using the AVL buffer (QIAamp viral RNA mini kit (Qiagen, 
Hilden, Germany)) as described in the kit guidelines, the sample was 
additionally incubated for 10 minutes at 60°C and 560µl of Ethanol 
70% was added for RNA perciptation. 
The tubes were decontaminated externally and moved out of the 
glove box for into room (ii) for RNA extraction. Extracted RNA was 
transferred to room (iii). Before leaving room (ii) protective suit, shoe-
boots, second pair of gloves were decontaminated with 1% incidine and 
incinerated.
The third room was divided into 3 sites to prevent carry over 
contamination: two pipetting sites seperated by aluminium partitions 
were used for the PCR mix site, and for the positive control site, and the 
last site was used to add sample RNA to the master mix and to run the 
real time PCR. The tests were performed by two local technician teams 
trained during the Ebola outbreak, working 1 day out of 2 under the 
supervision of 2-3 IPD biologists.
The post-analytical step corresponded to the validation of the results 
obtained by the technicians. Patient name, age, sex, residence, patient 
laboratory identifier, collection date, date of symptom onset, clinical 
status, lab result with Ct value were recorded in an excel database and 
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results dispatched daily to the physician at the ETC, WHO and the 
national coordination for Ebola response. 
Challenges, opportunities and recommendation’s
The availability of a real-time diagnosis allowed rapid diagnosis 
and supported epidemiologist investigation teams for early detection 
of cases, isolation, and contact tracing and population awareness. 
One issue was the long time spent in collecting and transporting 
samples inside the isolation wards due to biosafety procedures. This 
situation affected the rapid care of patients and the implementation of 
control measures to recover contacts cases after laboratory confirmation. 
The lack of adequate material recommended by WHO for the 
collection and transport of samples lead to the use of inadequate 
material. Rigorous training for sample receipt avoided any impact on 
the safety of laboratory staff handling the samples. There was some 
impact on the quality of the (hemolysis, heparin tubes inhibiting PCR) 
test results.
However, this epidemic presented also opportunities with 
international collaboration and exchange between the teams deployed 
in the field to combat the disease. In addition, the availability of sera 
bio banks with collected samples will allow the development and 
evaluation of new diagnostic methods for EBOV. 
In terms of recommendation, it is important to strengthen the 
training of local teams on biosecurity rules and laboratory facilities 
for Ebola and other hemorrhagic fever diagnosis in affected or 
endemic areas. It is also crucial to carry out research to develop mobile 
laboratories which will be used as point of care diagnostic during 
hemorrhagic fevers outbreaks and thus remove obstacles related to the 
mobility of field teams in low setting resources. The development of 
multiplex diagnostic tests is also necessary due to the co-circulation 
of several pathogens with similar symptoms in affected communities.
Diagnostic activities
The IPD laboratory tested samples from Ebola Treatment Centers 
(ETC) Médecins sans Frontières at Conakry and the Red Cross at 
different localities in Guinea. All persons with fever and at least three 
of the following symptoms: head- aches, lethargy, anorexia/loss of 
appetite, aching muscles or joints, stomach pain, difficulty swallowing, 
vomiting, difficulty breathing, diarrhea, hiccups , or fever and contact 
with known confirmed case were considered as suspect cases. Deceased 
patients corresponding to the suspect case definition and who had 
contact with confirmed cases were considered as probable cases. 
Clinical samples from suspects posed a high risk and were shipped 
safely to the laboratory (triple packaging) located at the Donka 
Hospital and handled using class III cabinet. For molecular detection of 
EBOV, the Realstar® Filovirus screen RT-PCR kit (Altona Diagnostics 
Hamburg, Germany) was available and recommended by WHO 
(Altona diagnostic, Filovirus real time RT-PCR). The IPD however 
used quantitative Taqman RT-PCRs for the detection of hemorrhagic 
fever viruses including Ebola Zaire, Ebola Sudan, Marburg, Yellow 
fever, Rift valley fever and Crimean Congo on a portable Smartcycler 
TD machine developed and validated in the context of the EU project 
VHF Diagnostics (FP6-INCO-032180) [3-6]. Serological assays were 
also used for detection of specific IgM and IgG (Winnipeg Canada and 
CDC USA) for particular cases. 
The viral genome can be detected as early as day 1 after disease 
onset in some patients, and viremia decreased in survivors about 
1 week and becomes undetectable about 3 weeks after disease onset 
[7]. However, EBOV infection cannot be excluded on the basis of a 
negative EBOV RT-PCR result in the early phase of the disease (1-3 
days after the onset of EBOV-associated symptoms in a patient) or 
beyond a week after disease onset. Therefore, for these particular cases, 
RT-PCR should be repeated or serological tests should be done to avoid 
false negative results.
Up to 1st June 2016, 17 623 samples from different regions were 
tested in the IPD laboratory at Donka Hospital, which corresponded 
to 55% of all samples tested by the 8 laboratories present in Guinea 
during the outbreak. In addition to laboratory activities, the IPD team 
participated in daily meetings organized by the WHO for results reporting. 
Research activities
Research activities were also performed by the IPD team during 
this EVD outbreak. A first study aimed to understand the chains of 
transmission in order to evaluate and optimize local control strategies 
for EVD. Confirmed and probable cases of Ebola virus disease 
reported in Conakry, Boffa, and Télimélé were positioned in chains 
of transmission. This study showed how one person can spread the 
disease to his contacts, and identified the community as the major 
source of infection followed by hospitals and funerals. Implementation 
of infection control in April 2014 led to reduction of transmission in 
hospitals and at funerals. In the community, the transmission dropped 
by 50% for patients that were admitted to hospital, but remained 
unchanged for those that were not. Simulations analyses showed that 
a 10% increase in hospital admissions could have reduced the length 
of chains by 26%. These results supported the objective to increase the 
capacity of EVD treatment centers both to care for EVD patients and 
to stop transmission in the community [8].
Another study was done to understand the molecular evolution of 
EBOV during the outbreak. Phylogenetic analysis revealed circulation 
of three distinct viral lineages in Guinea, including in the urban setting 
of Conakry and its surroundings. One lineage was unique to Guinea and 
closely related to the earliest sampled viruses of the epidemic. A second 
lineage contained viruses probably reintroduced from neighbouring 
Sierra Leone on multiple occasions, while a third lineage later spread 
from Guinea to Mali. Each lineage was defined by multiple mutations, 
including non-synonymous changes in the virion protein 35 (VP35), 
glycoprotein (GP) and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (L) proteins. 
These data illustrate the ongoing ability of EBOV to develop lineage-
specific and potentially phenotypically important variation.
A third study aimed to model case fatality ratios of Ebola patients 
using viremia [9]. A large dataset of laboratory results for EVD patients 
in Conakry between March 2014 and February 2015, were analyzed to 
characterize how viremia can change the probability of death. Viremia 
was found as an excellent predictor of outcome for individual EVD 
patients, with the probability of death increasing from 21% in those 
with low viremia to 81% in the high viremia group. These observations 
are particularly important for studies that aim to assess the efficacy of 
treatments in the absence of randomized trials.
Development of rapid test
Implementation of infection control lead to a decrease of 
transmission in Guinea [8] but reintroductions from Sierra Leone 
[10] and low community engagement i.e refusal to hospitalize family 
members, continued unsafe traditional burials, impatience with too 
long waiting times for test reults, and general sample transportation 
issues led to prolongation of the outbreak. 
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Currently, there is no approved vaccine or specific treatment for 
EVD; therefore, early identification of cases is crucial for the control of 
EVD epidemics, and a huge challenge in large urban centers.
In this context, the IPD laboratory and collaborators adapted 
and optimised a rapid test based on isothermal reverse transcription 
recombinase polymerase amplification (RT-RPA) for the detection of 
Ebola virus [11,12]. A mobile laboratory consisting of a mobile glove 
box and a Diagnostics-in-Suitcase (DiaS) powered by a battery and 
solar panel was used. Before deployment in Conakry a workshop was 
organized in Dakar from 19 to 23 January 2015, to evaluate the RPA in 
laboratory and field conditions without electricity and train Senegalese 
and Guinean technicians before deployment to Conakry. The efficiency 
was tested on post mortem swabs in Matoto in Conakry, Guinea as part 
of the reinforced surveillance strategy in April 2015 to reach the “zero 
case” goal. A total of 120/928 samples tested positive and the sensitivity 
and specificity was 100% in reference to real-time RT-PCR and results 
were provided within 30-60 minutes. This field deployment helped to 
improve burial management and community engagement.
Roles of IPD laboratory in Senegal
The IPD laboratory played also important roles in Senegal for 
establishment of preparedness and surveillance. Up to now, the 
laboratory tested 92 samples from Senegal and confirmed the unique 
EVD case [13]. Because the WHO recommends that specimens 
tested by RT-PCR in other laboratories should be sent to a WHO 
Collaborating Center for confirmatory testing, the first EVD case in 
Mali was also confirmed in Dakar. The IPD laboratory in Dakar also 
analyzed suspect cases samples from different African countries, 
Mali (10), Ghana (1), Bissau Guinea (1), Mauritania (2), Angola (1) 
and Gambia (4). This highlighted the need of capacity building for 
EVD diagnostics in Africa. In this context, different workshops were 
organized in Dakar to strengthen capacities for EVD diagnostic under 
high bio-safety conditions and prepare a future network response in 
Africa. From 9 to 12 March 2014, a first workshop was organized in 
Dakar and twelve African countries (Senegal, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroun, Centrafrican Republic, Ivory Coast, Bissau Guinea, 
Guinea Conakry, Mali, Togo, Tunisia and Morocco) participated in 
this workshop. During the outbreak, a truck was designed as BSL3+ 
mobile laboratory by several partners (P4 Lyon, Fondation Merieux, 
Inserm, Resaolab, Institut Pasteur and Réseau International des 
Instituts Pasteur). This project called EUWAM-Lab was funded by 
the EU and the objective was to deploy the mobile laboratory in West 
Africa for detection of class 4 pathogens including EBOV. For this 
purpose, African scientists had to be trained on diagnostic tools and 
bio-safety conditions used in the mobile laboratory. In this context, a 
second workshop was organized in Dakar from 20 to 24 July 2015 with 
different countries (France, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Ivory 
Coast, Guinea Conakry, Mali, Togo, Mauritania and Niger). Currently, 
the truck is parked in Conakry, Guinea, at Donka Hospital. 
On the clinical side, a workshop was also organized in Dakar by 
the project Inovative Medicines Initiative EbolaMoDRAD (Modern 
Approaches for developing bedside Rapid Diagnostics). The overall 
objective of the workshop was to share knowledge on the different 
aspects of Ebola virus disease: history, clinical diagnosis and 
interpretation of results, isolation measures, treatment and intensive 
care, supportive therapy, use of personal protection equipment (PPE), 
infection prevention and reporting procedures.
Conclusion
This EVD outbreak in West Africa is unprecedented in size and 
spread since the discovery of the virus in 1976. The mortality rates 
varied between 28 to 66% depending on the country and the outbreak 
seriously affected the livelihoods of people and the economies of the 
affected countries. The outbreak started in December 2013 in Guinea 
and was only identified and declared as EVD in March 2014 due to a 
Figure 1. Laboratory set up. (A-B) room for sample inactivation, glovebox in B used in case of power failure and in field deployment, (C) room for RNA extraction, (D) Room for master 
mix preparation (E) room to add sample RNA to the master mix and to run the real time PCR.
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lack of diagnostic tools. This delay in the identification led to the spread 
of the disease to a significant number of people around the world. In 
the absence of specific treatments and vaccines, the epidemiological 
surveillance and laboratory played crucial roles for the confirmation 
of suspect cases and release of non-cases during the outbreak. Re-
introductions of the virus from survivors were observed in Liberia, and 
this highlighted the important roles of surveillance and laboratory for 
rapid detection of any reintroduction or re-emergence of EVD.
The IPD laboratory is a WHO-approved collaborating Centre and 
was the first deployed laboratory to Conakry after the declaration of the 
disease. The IPD laboratory played important roles in (1) diagnostics 
in Guinea and tested 55% of all samples in the country, (2) better 
understanding of transmission chains in Conakry and the molecular 
evolution of the virus during the outbreak and (3) improvement of burial 
management and community engagement by developing a rapid test. 
It is uncertain when and where the next EVD outbreak may occur. 
Therefore, it is crucial for all countries at risk, to be prepared for 
detection of the disease as early as possible, and to have appropriate 
responses. In this context, it is crucial to strengthen capacities and the 
IPD laboratory organized different workshops for capacity building 
and network response for future.
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